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Inclusive Communities and Robust Causality: The 
Constant Struggle to Balance Access to the 
Courts with Protection for Defendants 
Claire Williams∗ 
Imagine living in a rental house where raw sewage has been 
piling up,1 where there is no adequate heating and cooling, 
where there are no life-saving carbon monoxide or smoke detec-
tors and the locks do not work.2 Instead of making the fixes nec-
essary to ensure that the house achieves a minimum level of hab-
itability, the landlord sues the city for even having housing codes 
that require such repairs, claiming that those repairs create a 
disparate impact by reducing affordable housing.3 Such re-
sistance puts cities in a tenuous situation.4 On the one hand, if 
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port and guidance during this process. Thank you also to the staff and editors—
especially Hannah Nelson, Franklin Guenthner, and Joe Janochowski—of Min-
nesota Law Review for all of their assistance in developing and fine-tuning my 
Note. Finally, I want to thank my parents, Deb Aronson and Ben Williams, for 
supporting me throughout my law school career and especially during the 
months that I worked on this Note. Copyright © 2017 by Claire Williams.  
 1. Jessica Masulli Reyes, Suit: Raw Sewage, Overcrowding Mar Congres-
sional Candidate’s Rentals, NEWS J. (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www 
.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/10/26/suit-raw-sewage 
-overcrowding-mar-congressional-candidates-rentals/92764926. 
 2. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
neglected state in which landlords left rental houses); Tristan Hallman, Dallas 
Makes Rules Tougher on Landlords with New Housing Standards, DALL. MORN-
ING NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-city-hall/ 
2016/09/28/dallas-gets-tough-landlords-improves-standards-renters (chroni-
cling landlord resistance to a city ordinance that required sufficient cooling ca-
pabilities). 
 3. See, e.g., Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-
cv-3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016). 
 4. In Minneapolis, the city is seeking to revoke the rental license of a land-
lord who has routinely been cited for housing violations and admits that he lacks 
the resources to maintain the properties. Randy Furst, Whistleblower: Minne-
apolis Out To Evict Landlord, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.startribune 
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cities aggressively enforce housing codes, they could end up en-
abling mass evictions that displace entire communities.5 On the 
other hand, if they do not enforce the codes, then landlords could 
continue to rent unsafe and unsanitary properties.6 
This hypothetical has real consequences when landlords 
bring the conflict between housing codes and safety into the 
courts. Landlords sue cities under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 
alleging disparate impact due to the enforcement of housing 
codes.7 Frustrated by these suits, the Supreme Court recently 
sought to give cities more protection by establishing a robust 
causality requirement for plaintiffs alleging disparate impact.8 
The new standard emphasized the requirement that plaintiffs 
identify a specific policy, not a one-time decision, that creates a 
disparate impact.9 The new standard was an attempt to allow 
local officials to exercise their discretion as they craft housing 
policy.10 
Even though robust causality could allow city officials more 
leeway when performing their jobs, it should be abandoned be-
cause it only functions as a redundant and unnecessary barrier 
to housing discrimination claims. Robust causality is deeply 
flawed because the Supreme Court failed to provide sufficient 
guidance to lower courts about when to apply the standard. As 
it stands now, the new robust causality standard is at odds with 
Supreme Court precedent regarding pleading for discrimination 
 
.com/whistleblower-minneapolis-out-to-evict-landlord/134951388. And in Dal-
las a rental company, rather than complying with minimum housing codes, de-
cided to evict 305 tenants. Editorial, Dallas Must Find a Way To Protect Ten-
ants, Preserve Affordable Housing, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2016/10/25/dallas-must-find 
-way-protect-tenants-preserve-affordable-housing. As a result of suits like 
these, cities are faced with the choice of either relaxing housing codes and al-
lowing substandard housing to persist, or enforcing the codes and potentially 
putting hundreds of people on the streets—a choice ironically brought to them 
under the Fair Housing Act. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See Dianne Solis, Judge Halts Mass Evictions in West Dallas Pending 
a Hearing on Merits of Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www 
.dallasnews.com/news/social-justice-1/2016/10/11/judge-halts-mass-evictions 
-west-dallas-pending-hearing-merits-case. 
 6. See, e.g., Hallman supra note 2; Reyes supra note 1. 
 7. See, e.g., Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; Ellis, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1. 
 8. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 2524 (discussing how this decision by the Court protected le-
gitimate government interests). 
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claims.11 Robust causality also reflects a desire to give deference 
to institutions and actors that still perpetuate a system of dis-
crimination, and does not recognize how modern forms of dis-
crimination operate.12 
This Note argues that the robust causality requirement has 
no place in disparate impact litigation. Such a standard ignores 
the long history of government-sanctioned housing discrimina-
tion and could further restrict access to courts for discrimination 
claims. The Supreme Court should abandon the robust causality 
standard and return to traditional disparate impact analysis 
and pleading requirements, which have sufficient protections for 
defendants. Part I of this Note discusses the history of the FHA, 
the history of the pleading standards in federal court, and the 
role disparate impact litigation has played, without the robust 
causality standard. Part II describes the robust causality deci-
sion, and illustrates the challenges and inconsistencies that ro-
bust causality creates. Part III argues that the Supreme Court 
should abandon the new standard because it restricts access to 
courts, and does not align with the FHA’s substantive goal of fair 
and safe housing. This Note ultimately concludes that the robust 
causality decision should be discarded because it creates confu-
sion as to what is required of plaintiffs and is an unnecessary 
and redundant standard. 
I.  BACKGROUND   
The Supreme Court decision in Texas Department of Hous-
ing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc. operates against a background of the rich history of housing 
and the normative judgments about access to courts. This Part 
establishes the three main areas of law that are implicated by 
the new robust causality standard from Inclusive Communities. 
Section A discusses the previous housing policies and efforts by 
the federal government to address housing discrimination. Sec-
tion B outlines the pleading standard for civil cases. Finally, Sec-
tion C discusses disparate impact litigation. 
 
 11. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13, 515 (2002) 
(holding that disparate impact plaintiffs do not need to plead a prima facie case 
to survive a motion to dismiss). 
 12. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrim-
ination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 745–49 (2005) (discussing the impact of subcon-
scious biases on decision-making); Jennifer C. Johnson, Race-Based Housing 
Importunities: The Disparate Impact of Realistic Group Conflict, 8 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L. 97, 120–25 (2007) (describing the various mechanisms used to isolate 
communities of color in particular neighborhoods). 
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A. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
This Section starts by chronicling how government and pri-
vate parties enabled and incentivized housing discrimination. 
Next, it discusses the FHA, an attempt by Congress to remove 
barriers to adequate housing. Finally, it highlights the history of 
housing codes and the challenges of enforcement. 
1. Before the Fair Housing Act 
The federal government has a long history of racially dis-
criminatory housing policies that facilitated segregation.13 In 
particular, the government incentivized homeownership, but the 
incentives have not been equally available to the entire popula-
tion.14 For example, the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), established in the mid-1930s to grant low-interest 
loans, appraised homes based on a system of categorization that 
devalued property in neighborhoods where predominantly black 
families lived.15 The Federal Housing Administration, which 
was responsible for categorizing homes and neighborhoods for 
loan eligibility with private companies, followed the example set 
by HOLC.16 It declared entire neighborhoods in city centers or 
in industrial areas ineligible for loans, which led to exodus and 
continued decline of property value.17 These discriminatory 
credit programs made it almost impossible for black homeowners 
to purchase homes.18 As a result, by 1960, 27.4% of the people 
 
 13. Since Reconstruction “the Federal Government itself was responsible 
for promoting racial discrimination in housing and residential segregation.” 
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due 1999: Addendum: United States of America, para. 214, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000). 
 14. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 190–91, 196–215 (1985) (discussing federal programs 
that benefitted homeowners and the ways in which communities of color were 
unable to take advantage of those programs). 
 15. Id. at 197–98. “[E]ven those neighborhoods with small proportions of 
black inhabitants were usually rated Fourth grade or ‘hazardous.’” Id. at 201. 
 16. Id. 213–15. 
 17. Id. at 213–14. The Federal Housing Administration has closely guarded 
its data, but one commentator, Charles Abrams, declared that the “FHA 
adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the Nuremberg 
laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all white neigh-
borhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities 
from buying houses in white neighborhoods.” Id. at 214. 
 18. Cf. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 115–40 
(2005) (describing how even programs like the G.I. Bill, which was meant to 
benefit both black and white veterans equally, could not help black veterans 
 2017] ROBUST CAUSALITY AND DISPARATE IMPACT 973 
 
living in city centers were black, compared to 5.4% in the outly-
ing suburban areas.19 These federal programs and policies both 
codified racial segregation in government actions and enabled 
private parties to further exacerbate already present segrega-
tion. 
In addition to federal loan programs, local zoning regula-
tions have also been used to exclude minority populations.20 
Some of those exclusions were explicit. For example, in Kentucky 
in the early 1900s there was an ordinance making it “unlawful 
for any colored person to move into and occupy as a residence . . . 
any house upon any block upon which a greater number of 
houses are occupied . . . by white people than are occupied . . . by 
colored people.”21 But housing discrimination was not always so 
direct. Exclusionary zoning ordinances focused on economics, in-
stead of race, such that they appeared neutral in theory, and be-
came discriminatory in application.22 Economically motivated 
zoning ordinances dictated the size of lots, the width of buildings, 
or the number of family units in a house.23 By reducing the den-
sity of housing or people, zoning regulations increased housing 
costs in that area, thereby indirectly excluding people of lower 
incomes.24 Rules that target building size appeared facially neu-
tral but “[i]n actuality zoning was a device to keep poor people 
 
overcome discriminatory obstacles to purchasing homes). These federal pro-
grams certainly did not create housing discrimination, but did perpetuate it at 
an “unprecedented scale.” See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 199. 
 19. Loren Miller, Government’s Responsibility for Residential Segregation, 
in RACE & PROPERTY 58, 58 (John H. Denton ed., 1964). Housing segregation is 
not without consequences. See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: 
RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 5 (1996) (detailing the benefits enjoyed 
by mostly-white suburbs). Minority neighborhoods are often plagued with inad-
equate schools and other substandard public services. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1289, 
1293 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (discussing how the Dallas Housing Authority had a “de-
liberate policy of strict racial segregation.”); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 
F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (describing Chicago Housing Authority’s quota 
system that was designed to segregate black families). 
 21. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1917). 
 22. Janai S. Nelson, Residential Zoning Regulations and the Perpetuation 
of Apartheid, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1699 (1996) (discussing how economic zon-
ing laws have discriminatory impact because often socioeconomic status is cor-
related with race). 
 23. J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 
761, 764 (1982). 
 24. Nelson, supra note 22, at 1699. In other contexts, lawmakers have uti-
lized what appear to be neutral building code requirements to affect a targeted 
and specific substantive impact. See, e.g., David Nather, Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Texas Abortion Clinic Regulations, STAT (June 27, 2016), https://www 
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. . . out of affluent areas.”25 With wealth as a proxy for race, these 
zoning regulations continued racially segregated housing pat-
terns that had been established by explicit racial limits. 
In addition to the exclusionary zoning regulations, local gov-
ernment decisions about the construction and allocation of af-
fordable housing exacerbated the problem of discrimination and 
segregation. Federal programs often relied upon “local initiative 
and responsibility,” which meant local governments had a large 
amount of discretion in deciding where to place public housing 
units.26 As a result, most suburbs did not have low-income hous-
ing.27 Cities were then left to build affordable housing units in 
city centers, which necessitated demolishing and displacing com-
munities already located there at the time.28 In the end, the 
housing policies and decisions created “[t]wo worlds . . . residen-
tially segregated minority areas with poor-quality schools, inad-
equate public facilities . . . and a suburban sphere whose hous-
ing, infrastructure, densities and ways of life [were] more 
expensive and expansive . . . .”29 The combination of federal, lo-
cal, and private decisions lent government authority to discrim-
inatory housing patterns and exacerbated housing discrimina-
tion. 
2. The Fair Housing Act Addressed the Barriers to Accessing 
Housing 
Recognizing the damaging effects of housing segregation, 
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act.30 In 1968, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the idea of fair housing legisla-
tion.31 The country was in the midst of the civil rights movement, 
including the passage of other landmark statutes, riots in major 
 
.statnews.com/2016/06/27/supreme-court-texas-abortion. 
 25. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 242. 
 26. Id. at 225. 
 27. Id. at 224–27. 
 28. Id. 
 29. HAAR, supra note 19, at 5. 
 30. Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Oc-
cupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2008). 
 31. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 17, 
1968), https://www.millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/ 
january-17-1968-state-union-address (last visited Dec. 3, 2017) (“The next es-
sential is more housing—and more housing now. Surely a nation that can go to 
the moon can place a decent home within the reach of its families . . . . I propose, 
for the consideration of this Congress, a 10-year campaign to build 6 million new 
housing units for low- and middle-income families.”). 
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cities, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.32 Con-
gress recognized that law (both federal and local) created “segre-
gation [that] led to ‘black ghettos’ across the United States, 
which resulted in a population of poor Blacks residing almost 
exclusively in low-income neighborhoods.”33 These laws, prefer-
ences, and motivations were a “relic of slavery,”34 so Congress 
made it a priority to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary barriers”35 that had been, in part, the result of uncurbed 
discretion of local zoning officials.36 
The FHA targeted overt obstacles to access.37 The goal of the 
FHA was “to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair 
housing throughout the United States.”38 The FHA made it un-
lawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide 
offer” to a person based upon “race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin.”39 It also prohibited discrimination “in 
 
 32. Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelop-
ment and the Supreme Court’’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. 
L. REV. 539, 552–53 (2014). 
 33. S. Lamar Gardner, #BlackLivesMatter, Disparate-Impact, and the 
Property Agenda, 43 S.U. L. REV. 321, 327 (2016). In 1966, before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Attorney General Katzenbach said 
that “it is highly relevant that government action—both State and Federal—
has contributed so much to existing patterns of housing segregation.” Civil 
Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 87 (1966). A statement that was confirmed by Roy 
Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP. Id. at 551. The same conversation 
happened in the Senate a year later, with Attorney General Ramsey Clark and 
the Department of Justice reiterating the enormous role the Federal Housing 
Authority and Veterans Administration had played in furthering segregation. 
Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban 
Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 34. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968). 
 35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 36. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 37. Scholars fiercely debate whether the FHA was effective. Compare Deb-
orah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and Beyond, 
11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 37 (2001) (“It may even be opined that the Fair Hous-
ing Act presents a smoke screen behind which lawmakers can hide, pretending 
the consequences of our racism are being dealt with, while in truth the separa-
tion of races remains unchallenged.”), with CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, 
WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR?: RACE, CLASS, AND RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES 
39 (2006) (“In addition to ending legal housing market discrimination, the Fair 
Housing Act marked the end of public discussion of residential segrega-
tion. . . .”). 
 38. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 39. Id. § 3604(a). 
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the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwell-
ing,”40 in the advertisement of the property,41 and in the repre-
sentation as to “when such dwelling is in fact so available.”42 
Congress attempted to provide a statutory avenue to counter the 
legal and cultural history of preventing people of color from even 
entering the housing market.43 The FHA acknowledged and ad-
dressed the discriminatory practices that had shaped the hous-
ing market. However, once a person had housing there was still 
the potential for discrimination in upkeep and maintenance of 
the space. Housing codes were next in the line of legal obligations 
to protect people from discriminatory housing practices. 
3. Enforcement and Impact of Housing Codes 
Housing codes are part of the fair-housing ideal enacted to 
ensure that all residents live in safe housing, regardless of soci-
oeconomic status. However, landlords sometimes challenge 
these codes because they increase operating costs. Also, housing 
codes often function like older zoning regulations, appearing fa-
cially neutral but in actuality targeting specific communities. 
a. Safety Housing Codes 
Housing codes were designed to ensure that all residents 
could live in safe buildings. In 1967, President Johnson created 
the Douglass Commission to study housing codes and develop 
standards in an effort to “insure decent and durable housing.”44 
The Commission recognized that racial segregation had led to 
substandard housing and fueled resentment in urban communi-
ties.45 Today housing “code enforcement remains the principal 
method by which cities can ensure that minimum housing con-
ditions are maintained.”46 They include provisions pertaining to 
“basic equipment and facilities for light, ventilation, heating and 
sanitation; for safety from fire; for crime prevention; for space, 
 
 40. Id. § 3604(b). 
 41. Id. § 3604(c). 
 42. Id. § 3604(d). 
 43. There are several subsections that pertain to substantive rights, such 
as prohibiting discrimination in rights and services following purchase. See Ol-
iveri, supra note 30, at 3–10 (detailing various provisions within the FHA and 
the ways in which they are meant to combat discriminatory practices). 
 44. Susan L. Ruby, The Great Society and Housing in America: Then and 
Now, 40 REAL EST. REV. J., Fall 2011, at 41, 41. 
 45. Id. at 42–43. 
 46. Richard E. Carlton, Richard Landfield & James B. Loken, Enforcement 
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 803 (1965). 
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use and location; and for safe and sanitary maintenance of all 
structures and premises.”47 Because it costs money to maintain 
a habitable housing unit, cities use blanket, rather than individ-
ual, enforcement to “eliminat[e] much of the competitive ad-
vantage of buildings with lower operating costs due to unde-
tected violations” with the hope of encouraging landlords to 
maintain minimum safety and habitability standards.48 
St. Paul, Minnesota, for example, had a series of housing 
codes meant to ensure safe housing and promote public health 
and safety. The Property Maintenance Code “[e]stablishe[d] 
minimum maintenance standards for all structures and prem-
ises” relating to safety, sanitation, and crime prevention.49 St. 
Paul also had a Department of Neighborhood Housing and Prop-
erty Improvement (DNHPI), which was “responsible for admin-
istering and enforcing the Housing Code.”50 The goal of the 
DNHPI was to “compel property owners to take greater respon-
sibility for their properties or, alternatively, force changes in 
ownership.”51 In addition, St. Paul enforced the housing codes 
through a code compliance certification procedure, which re-
quired an inspection for properties that had been remodeled or 
had been “deemed a dangerous structure, a nuisance building, 
or vacant.”52 However, landlords occasionally challenged the en-
forcement of housing codes as creating disparate impact on mi-
nority populations, arguing that maintenance costs landlords 
money which is then passed down to tenants leading to an in-
crease in the cost of affordable housing, a class of housing that is 
predominately used by minority populations.53 
 
 47. ST. PAUL, MINN., MUN. CODE ch. 6, § 34.01(1) (2005), https://library 
.municode.com/mn/st._paul/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIILECO_ 
TITVIBUHO_CH34MIPRMASTALSTPR [hereinafter ST. PAUL MUN. CODE]; 
see also MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., MUN. CODE ch. 12, § 244.20, https://library 
.municode.com/mn/minneapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_ 
TIT12HO_CH244MACO_ARTIGE_244.20PUPO (containing similar language). 
 48. Carlton et al., supra note 46, at 807. The City of Dallas was explicit that 
its recent changes to the housing code were meant to ensure that renters did 
not have to live at the “mercy of slumlords” and “ensure the rights of all resi-
dents of our city to live in safe, clean, quality homes in neighborhoods that are 
free of blight.” Hallman, supra note 2; Dallas Must Find a Way To Protect Ten-
ants, Preserve Affordable Housing, supra note 4.  
 49. ST. PAUL MUN. CODE, supra note 47. 
 50. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Magner, 619 F.3d at 833; Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv-
3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (“This lawsuit arises 
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One example of this type of litigation is Gallagher v. Mag-
ner.54 In that case, the landlords argued that “the City violated 
the FHA because aggressive enforcement of the Housing Code 
had a disparate impact on racial minorities.”55 The appellants 
were landlords who owned properties that had been “cited be-
tween ten and twenty-five violations per property for conditions 
including rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate 
sanitation facilities, inadequate heat, inoperable smoke detec-
tors, broken or missing doors and screens, and broken or missing 
guardrails or handrails.”56 These citations were a mix of basic 
repairs (such as missing guardrails or inoperable smoke detec-
tors) to more substantial violations (such as inadequate heat or 
sanitary facilities). They were not for cosmetic repairs, but ones 
that endangered the fundamental goal of “protect[ing] the public 
health, safety and welfare.”57 
The Eighth Circuit found that the landlords had sufficient 
evidence for a prima facie case that the enforcement of housing 
codes was creating a disparate impact.58 The landlords sup-
ported their allegations with statistics about the affordable 
housing shortage in St. Paul, the demographics of people need-
ing affordable housing, and the increase in costs for landlords 
that were passed on to tenants or resulted in the sale of proper-
ties, as well as statements from the U.S. Department of Housing 
 
out of Defendant City of Minneapolis’ (the “City”) alleged implementation of un-
lawful housing policies and heightened enforcement of those policies against in-
ner-city landlords in a discriminatory manner.”); McRae v. District of Columbia, 
No. 05-2272, 2007 WL 842963, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (“The plaintiff, the 
owner of several multi-family housing buildings, alleges that the District of Co-
lumbia engaged in practices that violated both the FHA and the DCHRA. . . . 
[Alleging violation by] issu[ing] a list of ‘Hot Properties,’ i.e., properties with 
serious housing code violations, and . . . prosecuting the owners of those proper-
ties.”); Bolden v. City of Topeka, No. Civ. A. 02-2635-KHV, 2004 WL 303521, at 
*3 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2004), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (“Count III alleges that the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by increas-
ing residential housing code standards to unreasonable levels; [and] aggres-
sively and selectively enforcing its policy against racial minorities . . . .”); Peoria 
Area Landlord Ass’n v. City of Peoria, 168 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (C.D. Ill. 2001) 
(“Plaintiffs respond that the Ordinances . . . have a disparate impact . . . .”). 
 54. Magner, 619 F.3d at 828. 
 55. Id. at 833. 
 56. Id. at 830. 
 57. ST. PAUL MUN. CODE, supra note 47, at ch. 6, § 34.01.  
 58. Magner, 619 F.3d at 837. 
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and Urban Development (HUD) detailing a decrease in afforda-
ble housing in St. Paul.59 The Eighth Circuit found that “the ex-
istence of a significant statistical disparity, even one resulting 
from economic inequality, [was] sufficient to create a prima facie 
case . . . .”60 The landlords conceded that the housing codes were 
necessary for maintaining “minimum property maintenance 
standards, keeping the City clean and housing habitable, and 
making the City’’s neighborhoods safe and livable.”61 They pro-
posed that the city return to an older program that focused on 
maintaining positive relationships with landlords.62 
The Eighth Circuit was satisfied with the alternative policy 
outlined by the landlords, meaning that St. Paul had to abandon 
its challenged housing code policy and return to an older ver-
sion.63 In the face of lawsuits like Magner, cities and local gov-
ernments trying to pursue legitimate government objectives 
“can’t even make slumlords kill rats without fear of a lawsuit.”64 
Housing codes represent a difficult balancing act for cities as 
they try to protect tenants from substandard housing while also 
not contributing to the rising cost of affordable housing. 
b. Targeted Housing Codes 
Cities and developers often have housing codes that appear 
to be aimed only at safety or who lives there. For example, these 
ordinances are passed “as a means of preventing overcrowding, 
minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an un-
due financial burden on” the school system.65 But facially neu-
tral laws can still be discriminatory.66 Cities have a history of 
enacting housing codes to maintain minimum safety, but they do 
not always effectuate those goals—either because they are chal-
lenged by landlords hoping to avoid financial obligations, or be-
cause the concerns about safety are influenced by white, middle-
class conceptions of housing. 
 
 59. Id. at 834–35. 
 60. Id. at 836 (quoting Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 
1169, 1180 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1995)). 
 61. Id. at 837. 
 62. Id. at 837–38. 
 63. Id. at 838. 
 64. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 65. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–500 (1977). 
 66. See id.; Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par-
ish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (E.D. La. 2009); United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 
887 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (D. Haw. 1995). 
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For example, in United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., a private 
housing development limited the number of people who could 
live in each apartment type.67 The court found that the re-
striction discriminated against the plaintiffs based upon family 
status, because the policy was not tied to the square-footage of 
the apartment.68 The court cited expert analysis that deter-
mined “that Tropic Seas’ occupancy provision regarding studio 
and one-bedroom apartments would exclude 92 to 95 percent of 
all families with children, but only 19 to 21 percent of all families 
without children.”69 The plaintiffs also had a letter written by 
the vice-president of the development company that intimated 
that “the concern was not occupancy standards, but rather was 
children . . . .”70 On the surface the rule is about occupancy num-
bers, but in practice it created a heavy burden on families with 
children. 
The blood-relative ordinance is an example of a facially neu-
tral city ordinance that was racially discriminatory in practice.71 
St. Bernard Parish, near New Orleans, Louisiana, passed an or-
dinance that prohibited people from renting single-family homes 
to nonblood relatives.72 It also placed a moratorium on the con-
struction of multi-family dwellings.73 The parish had only passed 
the law in order to help rebuild the community in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina,74 but the federal district court held that the 
ordinance, despite being facially neutral, was racially targeted.75 
The city councilperson who proposed the ordinance stated that 
its purpose was to “maintain the demographics of St. Bernard 
Parish,” which at the time was primarily white.76 The public con-
versation surrounding the ordinance also included references to 
“‘ghetto,’ ‘crime,’ ‘blight,’ and ‘shared values’ [which] are similar 
to the types of expressions that courts in similar situations have 
 
 67. 887 F. Supp. at 1352 (“Apartments ordinarily will be limited to occu-
pancy by the following number of persons: studio and one-bedroom apartments, 
two persons; two-bedroom apartments, three persons. This does not apply to 
houseguests.”). 
 68. Id. at 1361–62. 
 69. Id. at 1360. 
 70. Id. at 1361. 
 71. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 565. 
 72. Id. at 565 n.1. 
 73. Id. at 566. 
 74. Id. at 565. 
 75. Id. at 577. 
 76. Id. at 569–70. 
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found to be nothing more than ‘camouflaged racial expres-
sions.’”77 Based upon that evidence “the [c]ourt conclude[d] that 
the Parish and Council’s intent in enacting and continuing the 
moratorium is and was racially discriminatory,” even though the 
ordinance never mentioned race.78 
These examples highlight the complicated history of local 
housing code objectives and impact. The government, both local 
and federal, has made efforts to increase access and quality of 
housing, but past discrimination has created patterns and sys-
tems that still impact communities today, even through facially 
neutral policies. 
B. PLEADING STANDARD 
Pleading requirements are the entry point to court for plain-
tiffs. Older pleading standards and requirements created a 
highly formalized system that produced detailed pleadings that 
were “at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming, and at 
most productive of confusion as to the real merits of the cause 
and even of actual denial of justice.”79 Notice pleading developed 
as a way to ensure that parties were not prevented from having 
their day in court because of a procedural deficiency.80 Under the 
notice pleading system, plaintiffs merely submit a complaint, 
which is a means of notifying the court and the opposing party 
of the facts and legal issues.81 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were adopted 
in response to the failings of the previous system.82 The pleading 
standard created by the FRCP was much more liberal, requiring 
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”83 The function of a pleading that 
follows Rule 8 of the FRCP is to “give the defendant fair notice 
of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
 
 77. Id. at 571 (quoting Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th 
Cir. 1982)). 
 78. Id. at 577. 
 79. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1943). 
 80. See id. at 458 (discussing how lawyers took advantage of the compli-
cated pleading procedures); Elizabeth Roseman, A Phoenix from the Ashes? 
Heightened Pleading Requirements in Disparate Impact Cases, 36 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2006) (“These rigid requirements made a litigant’s day in 
court more a game of semantic skill than a decision on the merits of the claim.”). 
 81. Clark, supra note 79, at 456–57. 
 82. See Roseman, supra note 80, at 1047. 
 83. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a)(2). 
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rests.”84 The goal of the more liberal pleading requirements was 
to “focus litigation on the merits of a claim” rather than for liti-
gants and courts to get lost in the procedural details.85 
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal refined the requirements under 
Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly held that n order to adequately show the 
grounds upon which a claim rests, the complaint must have 
enough facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”86 In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint 
needs “allegations [that] plausibly suggest[]”87 that the alleged 
conduct has taken place. The Supreme Court emphasized in 
these cases that it did not create a “heightened fact pleading of 
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”88 
The plausibility standard was further explained in Iqbal, 
which outlined a two-step process for analyzing plausibility. 
First, the judge examines the allegations to determine which are 
facts and which are legal conclusions.89 Second, using only the 
factual allegations, the judge determines whether the complaint 
is plausible.90 Plausibility is a “context-specific task that re-
quires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”91 It invites inclusion of the judge’s point of view 
because the “determinations of plausibility depend on baseline 
assumptions about the way the world usually works”92 and such 
assumptions can “carry the imprint of judges’ individual back-
grounds and biases.”93 The language of “experience and common 
sense” contrasts the objective language in Boumediene v. Bush 
that highlighted judicial “expertise and competence” rather than 
experience and common sense.94 The post-Iqbal pleading system 
 
 84. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citing Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
 85. Id. at 514. 
 86. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 87. Id. at 557. 
 88. Id. at 570. 
 89. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 90. See id. at 679. 
 91. Id. at 679. 
 92. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473, 498 (2010). 
 93. Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority 
Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 
1451 (2010).  
 94. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008); Kassem, supra note 
93, at 1453. 
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now encourages judges to import their own life experiences when 
determining whether a plaintiff ’s allegations are a plausible ex-
planation of the facts. 
The Supreme Court has also considered the interaction been 
the pleading standard and the prima facie case. In Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plain-
tiff alleging disparate treatment needed to plead a prima facie 
case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.95 The Supreme 
Court rejected that pleading requirement for two reasons. First, 
the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard and had no place 
at the pleading stage.96 Second, when courts required plaintiffs 
to plead a prima facie case, they were creating a heightened 
pleading standard that went beyond the goal of notice plead-
ing.97 The Supreme Court favorably cited it’s decision in 
Swierkiewicz in its Twombly decision, indicating that it still en-
visioned a liberal pleading standard like the one articulated in 
Swierkiewicz.98 
Having a liberal pleading standard like notice pleading is a 
vital part of the legal system because it shapes which cases have 
their day in court. When plaintiffs bring housing discrimination 
cases, this pleading stage is the first barrier. If it is raised higher 
or invites judges to incorporate their own sense of what is nor-
mal, it could lead to more and more discrimination cases being 
dismissed if judges just do not believe that discrimination is an 
issue that still persists.99 
C. DISPARATE IMPACT 
One of the methods for proving discrimination is disparate 
impact, which seeks to challenge “practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent” that 
still operate to maintain “the status quo of prior discriminatory 
. . . practices.”100 The Supreme Court discussed and affirmed dis-
parate impact in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. In that case, a factory 
originally had a discriminatory hiring procedure that confined 
 
 95. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). 
 96. See id. at 511. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 99. A subjective standard could allow judges to dismiss cases “simply be-
cause such cases do not seem to mesh with a particular judge’s experience and 
his or her common sense.” Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of 
New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litiga-
tion, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 238 (2011). 
 100. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
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people of color to lower-paying positions.101 Then, after the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company switched to 
using a facially neutral policy—requiring a high school diploma 
and the completion of two different general intelligence tests.102 
The Supreme Court held that the requirements were unlawful 
because the purpose of the Civil Rights Act—much like the pur-
pose of the FHA—was to “remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white” people over other 
groups.103 Plaintiffs could use antidiscrimination legislation to 
challenge barriers that were “overt[ly] discrimin[atory] [and] 
also practices [or barriers] that are fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation.”104 Plaintiffs could use disparate-impact liabil-
ity to challenge systematic policies that favored, even indirectly, 
certain groups over others. 
Disparate-impact liability does not depend upon the inten-
tion of the actor. Antidiscrimination statutes were meant to ad-
dress and remove “mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in head-
winds’ for minority groups.”105 The FHA follows the same 
principles as those discussed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Even 
before the Supreme Court officially recognized disparate-impact 
liability under FHA, other courts acknowledged that “[e]ffect, 
and not motivation, is the touchstone” for discrimination under 
FHA because “clever men may easily conceal their motivations, 
but more importantly, because ‘whatever our law was once, . . . 
we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thought-
lessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the 
public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.’”106 Even 
without intent, laws, and the people who enforce them, can cre-
ate effects that disadvantage certain groups. Disparate-impact 
liability plays an important role in the legal landscape because 
it allows plaintiffs to challenge practices that appear to be fa-
cially neutral but in reality have a greater impact on a specific 
category of people. 
These three sections highlighted the major legal issues at 
play in the Inclusive Communities decision. The Supreme Court 
 
 101. Id. at 427.  
 102. Id. at 427–28. 
 103. Id. at 429–30. 
 104. Id. at 431. 
 105. Id. at 432. 
 106. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)). 
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decided Inclusive Communities against a backdrop of past gov-
ernment-sanctioned and -incentivized housing discrimination. 
The decision also implicated the methods that plaintiffs use to 
challenge housing practices. Finally, the decision addressed the 
on-going struggles associated with the substantive goal of the 
FHA to provide fair housing to all. This next part contextualizes 
the Inclusive Communities decision within these three issues. 
II.  ROBUST CAUSALITY ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE 
DISCRETION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITH 
ACCESS TO COURTS   
In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court held that dis-
parate impact was a theory of liability under the FHA and intro-
duced a new standard, robust causality, to evaluate claims of 
disparate impact. But its holding was flawed in four important 
ways: (1) the Court did not provide sufficient guidance for the 
lower courts for applying robust causality; (2) it conflicts with 
Supreme Court precedent for pleading; (3) it casts a pall on dis-
parate-impact claims before they even reach the merits stage; 
and (4) the holding grants the benefit of the doubt to zoning offi-
cials and cities who do not warrant such deference from courts. 
Section A analyzes the Inclusive Communities decision and 
its robust causality standard. Section B demonstrates the lack of 
guidance that the new standard provides for lower courts. Sec-
tion C compares the new robust causality standard to the hold-
ing in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema. Finally, Section D explains how 
the Supreme Court imprudently granted unnecessary and un-
warranted leeway to cities. 
A. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES AND THE ROBUST CAUSALITY 
STANDARD 
The Supreme Court recognized disparate-impact liability 
under the FHA in Inclusive Communities.107 The Inclusive Com-
munities Project (ICP), a nonprofit organization that advocated 
for racial and socioeconomic housing integration in Dallas, chal-
lenged the method by which the Texas Department of Housing 
and Community Affairs (the Department) distributed tax credits 
for affordable housing developments.108 The Department distrib-
uted tax credits to developers and developments through the 
 
 107. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513–14 (2015). 
 108. Id. 
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Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program.109 A devel-
opment that received tax credits through LIHTC could not “re-
fuse housing solely because a person is using a Section 8 
voucher.”110 Because developments that accepted LIHTCs could 
not refuse housing based solely on Section 8 vouchers, the distri-
bution of LIHTCs influenced where people with low incomes 
could live.111 
The plaintiffs challenged the Department’s method of dis-
persing affordable housing because, they alleged, it created a dis-
parate impact.112 In distributing tax credits, the Department 
scored applications based upon statutory and nonstatutory fac-
tors, such as the location of good schools.113 But, despite the scor-
ing system, the Department retained discretion in the final de-
cision as to which developers and which projects received tax 
credits.114 ICP alleged that, in exercising its discretion, the De-
partment “continued segregated housing patterns by its dispro-
portionate allocation of the tax credits.”115 ICP argued that the 
Department created a disparate impact by “granting too many 
credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and 
too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.”116 
The district court found that ICP had enough statistical ev-
idence to demonstrate that the Department’s distribution of tax 
credits created a disparate impact.117 The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed that disparate impact could create liability un-
der the FHA, and held further that such claims were evaluated 
 
 109. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–15 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), 
aff ’d Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015).  
 110. Id. at 314. Section 8 is a government program that subsidizes housing 
“so eligible families can afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing.” 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.1(a)(1) (2017). 
 111. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. §§ 2306.6710(a)–(b) (West 2008); Tex. Op. Att’y. 
Gen. No. GA-0208, at 2–6 (2004). 
 114. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 317, 319. 
 115. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 (N.D. Tex. 2010). ICP relied on a report prepared for 
the Texas House of Representatives that showed “77% of LIHTC units in the 
city of Dallas were in above-average minority areas.” Id. 
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under a burden-shifting test.118 The Department then appealed 
the issue of disparate impact under the FHA to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.119 
The Supreme Court recognized that the FHA allowed for 
suits based upon disparate impact.120 It compared the language 
in the FHA with that in employment discrimination legislation, 
like the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) and 
Title VII.121 Previous interpretations of ADEA and Title VII “in-
struct[ed] that antidiscrimination laws must be construed to en-
compass disparate-impact claims when their text refers to the 
consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and 
where that interpretation is consistent with statutory pur-
pose.”122 All three statutes contain the word otherwise at the end 
of a list of prohibited activities.123 The Court held that “other-
wise” signaled “a shift in emphasis from an actor’s intent to the 
consequences of his actions,” meaning that, like ADEA and Title 
VII, FHA included liability for disparate impact.124 
In recognizing disparate-impact liability, the Court also in-
troduced a new standard, robust causality, to impose some limi-
tations.125 The Court emphasized that “[d]isparate-impact liabil-
ity mandates the ‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers,’ not the displacement of valid governmen-
tal policies.”126 The robust causality standard was intended to 
prevent disparate-impact liability from transforming the FHA 
into “an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder their 
priorities” because the FHA was designed only to ensure housing 
 
 118. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
747 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). The court 
adopted the burden-shifting framework promulgated by HUD. Id. The plaintiff 
first has to show that the action has or will have a discriminatory effect. 24 
C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017). If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then shifts 
to defendant to show that “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one 
or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent 
or defendant.” Id. If the defendant can satisfy its burden, then the plaintiff can 
still prevail if it can show that there is an alternative practice that will achieve 
similar goals but with less discriminatory effect. Id. 
 119. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2515 (2015). 
 120. Id. at 2515–22. 
 121. Id. at 2519 (“Title VII’s and the ADEA’s ‘otherwise adversely affect’ lan-
guage is equivalent in function and purpose to the FHA’s otherwise make una-
vailable’ language.”). 
 122. Id. at 2518. 
 123. Id. at 2519. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 2522–23. 
 126. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
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authorities achieved their objectives “without arbitrarily creat-
ing discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation” and not 
to dictate the housing policy of different areas.127 
For the actual mechanics of the standard, robust causality 
uses similar requirements as typical disparate-impact cases, but 
requires more from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs still need to identify both 
the statistics that show disparate impact and the policy or poli-
cies alleged to have caused that impact.128 From its original con-
ception in Griggs, courts have required that plaintiffs alleging 
disparate-impact claims have to provide the statistics and iden-
tify the policy that created the impact.129 The Court did not 
change the pieces that are part of a disparate-impact case, how-
ever the language surrounding the traditional requirements sig-
nal that the Court requires more from plaintiffs alleging dispar-
ate impact under the FHA. 
The additional language compels more from plaintiffs be-
cause it places an emphasis on the causal connection and shifts 
the causal inquiry to earlier in the litigation process. First, in 
terms of causality, the Court made it clear that the limitations 
were intended to prevent defendants (which would mostly be cit-
ies or other local governments130) from being “held liable for ra-
cial disparities they did not create.”131 The combination of the 
term robust and the Court’s articulated reasoning of protecting 
defendants creates an impression that courts should even more 
carefully scrutinize whether the policy or policies actually 
caused the disparity. Second, in addition to requiring a stronger 
showing of causation, robust causality also shifts the focus from 
the prima facie stage to the pleading stage. The Court held that 
“[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or pro-
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2523. 
 129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (analyzing the consequences of the defendant’s 
practices). 
 130. See J. William Callison, Inclusive Communities: Geographic Desegrega-
tion, Urban Revitalization, and Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 
46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1039, 1049 (2016) (“Larger institutions, such as governmen-
tal entities, banks and insurance companies, are more likely to have placement, 
financing, lending and insurance underwriting ‘policies’ that bring disparate 
impact analysis into play.”). 
 131. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. The limitations were 
also intended “to protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact 
claims.” Id. at 2524. The Court was concerned that allowing abusive disparate-
impact claims would undermine the purpose of the FHA. Id. 
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duce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection can-
not make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”132 That 
language in the decision instructs lower courts to “examine with 
care whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact.”133 If a plaintiff does not have sufficient factual 
allegations at the pleading stage “demonstrating a causal con-
nection” then the complaint “cannot make out a prima facie case 
of disparate impact” and should be dismissed.134 Unlike the 
pleading standard used by Griggs and its progeny, robust cau-
sality gives more deference to the decisions of the defendant, of-
ten zoning officials who have to “make decisions based on a mix 
of factors.”135 
In Inclusive Communities the Court recognized disparate- 
impact liability under the FHA, but at the same time announced 
a standard for lower courts that specifically concentrated on 
shifting through and weighing cases at an early stage. The Court 
created a pathway for plaintiffs to allege disparate impact under 
the FHA, but balanced the potential for liability with a more de-
manding standard so that defendants would have more room to 
act without legal consequence. 
B. ROBUST CAUSALITY IS FLAWED BECAUSE IT LACKS 
GUIDANCE FOR LOWER COURTS 
The Supreme Court endeavored to balance allowing govern-
ments to take action without fear of litigation from residents and 
landlords with allowing plaintiffs to challenge government ac-
tion through disparate-impact liability, but its holding in Inclu-
sive Communities is flawed because it failed to provide sufficient 
guidance to lower courts in two important areas. First, it created 
confusion about which stage of litigation (pleading or prima fa-
cie) is subject to robust causality. Second, it created uncertainty 
about what would qualify as a policy, a necessary component of 
the robust causality standard. 
1. At What Stage of Litigation Does Robust Causality Apply? 
The language in Inclusive Communities is not clear about 
when the robust causality standard should be employed, at sum-
mary judgment phase or earlier at the pleading stage, which con-
 
 132. Id. at 2523. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
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flicts with the nature of the two different stages of litigation. In-
clusive Communities and the cases that it cites were decided at 
summary judgment phase,136 or at a more developed stage of lit-
igation where plaintiffs would be required to have a prima facie 
case.137 But the language in the Supreme Court decision impli-
cates both motions for summary judgment and pleadings. The 
Court stressed the need for “adequate safeguards at the prima 
facie stage” and also held that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege 
facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demon-
strating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case 
of disparate impact.”138 The opinion ties together robust causal-
ity, prima facie, and the pleading stage, which is likely to lead to 
confusion among lower courts as to when to apply a robust cau-
sality requirement. The confusion is probable because not all dis-
parate-impact cases make it to the summary judgment phase; 
some cases are decided as the result of motions much earlier in 
the litigation process, like motions to dismiss.139 
In fact, lower courts have used robust causality when decid-
ing motions to dismiss, applying a stricter standard earlier in 
litigation. In Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, the court applied the 
robust causality requirement at the pleading stage.140 The court 
dismissed the case, holding that “a plaintiff must adequately al-
lege—at the pleading stage—facts demonstrating a causal con-
nection between the challenged policy and the alleged dispar-
ity.”141 The court specifically cited the burden-shifting 
framework from Inclusive Communities without acknowledging 
that in Inclusive Communities the courts were determining the 
appropriate standard for summary judgments.142 
Applying robust causality standard at the pleading stage, as 
the court did in Ellis, is in tension with the informational asym-
 
 136. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district 
court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Appel-
lants challenge the summary judgment order . . . .”). 
 137. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491–92 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 138. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (emphasis added). 
 139. See Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045, 2016 WL 1222227, at 
*4 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (illustrating an FHA claim being decided on a mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings, which is analyzed under the motion to dis-
miss standard). 
 140. Id. at *5. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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metries early in litigation. For disparate-impact cases, the plain-
tiffs need evidence about the defendant’s purposes or institu-
tional practices to satisfy prima facie.143 Parties have the oppor-
tunity through discovery to develop the factual record, including 
evidence of the defendant’s motivations and practices, between 
pleading and summary judgment.144 Under the current sum-
mary judgment process “the plaintiff has a right to substantial 
discovery; she is in effect entitled to search the haystack for nee-
dles.”145 But, at the pleading stage, there is still an informational 
asymmetry.146 Some evidence of practice or policy could be gath-
ered before discovery, but often such evidence is in the exclusive 
control of the defendant, and only accessible to the plaintiff 
through discovery.147 “The Court’s emphasis on an early causa-
tion showing, coupled with its limitations on the use of statistical 
discrepancies, renders housing disparate-impact claims particu-
larly difficult.”148 Requiring plaintiffs to have evidence of the de-
fendant’s inner workings, at the pleading stage, ignores the re-
ality of discovery. 
Even without robust causality the pleading stage can be par-
ticularly challenging for disparate-impact claimants. For exam-
ple, in Strauss v. City of Chicago, the plaintiff alleged that the 
Chicago Police Department had a practice of hiring individuals 
with a history of brutality.149 To support his allegation, he relied 
 
 143. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still 
Out for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
719, 726 (2013). 
 144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is 
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of 
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored 
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other mate-
rials . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), 
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). 
 145. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 
108 (2009). 
 146. “The plaintiff ’s failure to plead unknowable facts could in some cases 
result in dismissal of a claim that should have been successful, and net social 
welfare decreases as the defendant unjustly retains wealth that should have 
compensated plaintiff for her injury.” Id. at 114. 
 147. Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspec-
tive, 52 HOW. L.J. 31, 58–69 (2008). 
 148. Callison, supra note 130, at 1050. 
 149. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 992 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:969 
 
upon statistical analysis of complaints against that police de-
partment.150 The court granted the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, even though it recognized that “plaintiffs will lack the in-
formation necessary to meet even the minimum pleading 
requirements . . . set out here until they are allowed discov-
ery.”151 When challenging an institution based upon its internal 
practices and policies, discovery is a vital tool, without which dis-
criminatory actions are likely to go unremedied. 
The facts from Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. offer an example of how an information asymmetry could 
function in the housing context, with outsiders who are only 
armed with statistics.152 In that case, the plaintiffs were two 
white tenants who alleged that the apartment owner employed 
tactics to exclude people of color from the building.153 As tenants, 
those plaintiffs might have knowledge about patterns in building 
operation, but it is more likely that all that they could point to 
would be the demographics of the apartment complex. Because 
they were tenants and not employees they would not have had 
direct access to application procedures. They were outside of the 
application process, like Strauss in Strauss v. City of Chicago. 
The denied applicants would be even further outside the process. 
Tenants might have heard of other people who had been rejected 
or have statistics, but without discovery or other access to the 
owner, they would not be able to point to a specific policy. Their 
lack of insider knowledge is not a reason to deny them access to 
discover if they have a plausible complaint. 
Some commentators have argued that allowing too many 
cases past the pleading stage will lead to abusive litigation or 
fishing expeditions.154 Fishing expeditions are speculative 
claims that plaintiffs bring to court with the hope of proceeding 
to discovery to find other adverse information.155 Courts and 
 
 150. Id. at 768. 
 151. Id. at 769. 
 152. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 153. Id. at 208. 
 154. Strauss, 760 F.2d at 770 (discussing how a creative lawyer could create 
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commentators have often cast fishing expeditions as a drain on 
the litigation process because they allow plaintiffs to rely on 
vague circumstances and then extract more damaging infor-
mation from the defendant, sometimes about an entirely differ-
ent matter.156 While there is always a potential for abusive or 
speculative litigation, Professor Elizabeth Thornburg argues 
that the term fishing expedition is coded language used by 
judges and lawyers to influence or reinforce attitudes about the 
merits of certain types of litigation.157 Largely, the phrase has 
been used to cast doubt on the merits of cases alleging discrimi-
nation—cases where judges are often already skeptical of the 
merits.158 Courts’ reliance on the fishing expedition metaphor 
also undercuts the American legal system’s belief that discovery 
“eliminate[s] surprise, lead[s] to enlightened settlements, and 
when necessary, facilitate[s] more focused and efficient tri-
als.”159 The fishing expedition narrative also conflicts with the 
reality of how discovery is used.160 Most cases have little to no 
discovery.161 There will certainly be cases where plaintiffs file 
complaints as a harassment tactic or as a fishing strategy, but 
these appear to be limited examples. 
Despite the potential for abuse, disparate impact is too vital 
a tool to severely limit it. The Supreme Court has previously 
acknowledged the potential for abusive litigation and rejected 
that argument as a rationale for making the pleading standard 
stricter.162 In the face of that argument, the Court championed 
a liberal pleading standard.163 In a modern setting discrimina-
tion is not always blatant, or even intentional.164 Often an or-
ganization will rely on a traditional practice without realizing 
 
 156. Id. at 11–27. 
 157. Id. at 43. 
 158. Id. at 48–49. 
 159. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301 (2002). 
 160. Empirical research has shown that “the typical case has relatively little 
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 161. Subrin, supra note 159, at 308. 
 162. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002). 
 163. Id.; see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1293, 1301–02 (2010). 
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that it furthers or creates a “built in headwind[] for minority 
groups.”165 It is not easy to identify or challenge discrimination 
when it is motivated by unconscious bias or influenced by stere-
otypes in decision-makers.166 But these unconsciously motivated 
actions still produce discriminatory effects that have a real im-
pact on people in minority groups.167 Even in Inclusive Commu-
nities the Court recognized the role that disparate impact plays 
in “counteract[ing] unconscious prejudices and disguised animus 
that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.”168 Con-
gress can create laws to attempt to protect minority groups or 
remove more barriers, but courts actually ensure that the rights 
of individuals and minority groups are protected.169 Courts can-
not fulfill that role if plaintiffs cannot bring cases. 
The robust causality requirement is also not likely to be lim-
ited to disparate-impact cases under the FHA. Observers have 
argued that the robust causality requirement will be limited to 
race-based claims under the FHA.170 However, those same ob-
servers have acknowledged that the holding could extend to 
other protected classes.171 And courts have cited the robust cau-
 
REV. 2677, 2681 (2004) (recognizing that there are social, historical and eco-
nomic factors that can influence actions). 
 165. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
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 167. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (holding that even though the company 
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 168. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
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Act of 1964 really became a “major instrument of social progress because of the 
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 170. Callison, supra note 130, at 1048–49. 
 171. Id. at 1049. 
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sality requirement in cases about racial discrimination in em-
ployment,172 age discrimination in employment,173 sex discrimi-
nation in employment174 and racial discrimination in voting 
rights.175 As other courts begin using the robust causality stand-
ard in other disparate impact arenas (such as Title VII or 
ADEA), even more plaintiffs will be at risk of having their law-
suit dismissed too soon, before relevant evidence is even availa-
ble. Robust causality has the potential to impact many plaintiffs, 
stopping complaints in their tracks at the pleading stage because 
the Court was not clear about when the standard should be ap-
plied. 
2. What Counts as a Policy Under Robust Causality? 
In its holding from Inclusive Communities, the Supreme 
Court was also unclear about what a policy is. In Inclusive Com-
munities, it emphasized that “a disparate-impact claim that re-
lies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot 
point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that dispar-
ity.”176 The Court only briefly discussed policy and noted “a one-
time decision may not be a policy at all.”177 The Court stated that 
disparate impact is meant to remove policies that create “artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”178 However, in an era 
of subconscious or unintentional discrimination179 the ambiguity 
around policy could prevent plaintiffs from challenging im-
portant categories of decisions. 
The definition of policy is especially important in banking 
and mortgage lending. In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo, the 
 
 172. Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 191 (D. Mass. 2015) (re-
quiring a showing of robust causality, in a race-based employment discrimina-
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plaintiffs challenged the lending practices of Wells Fargo, argu-
ing that the bank gave predatory loans to minority applicants.180 
Los Angeles alleged that Wells Fargo engaged in redlining and 
reverse redlining, lending practices that concentrates minority 
groups into specific, usually less desirable, areas of a city.181 The 
court was not convinced that Los Angeles had identified an ac-
tual policy that led to these alleged outcomes.182 Los Angeles ar-
gued that the lack of adequate safeguards and monitoring had 
produced a disparate impact, intimating that they were chal-
lenging Wells Fargo’s policy and practice of giving discretion to 
loan officers.183 The court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for sum-
mary judgment because Los Angeles had failed to identify a spe-
cific policy leading to discrimination, thus failing to meet the ro-
bust causality requirement.184 City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo 
& Co., demonstrates that courts are utilizing the robust causal-
ity standard at the pleading stage to dismiss cases because of the 
ambiguity of policy. 
It could certainly be argued that a lawsuit is an ineffective 
means of addressing what could be characterized as a lack of a 
policy or an amorphous policy that gives employees more discre-
tion. For an employer, it could be more difficult to change a struc-
ture of discretion as opposed to an explicit company policy to, for 
example, deny loans to people of color. But modern forms of dis-
crimination are more likely to come from people in positions of 
power who “‘unthinkingly discriminate’ without having any idea 
they are doing so.”185 Banks are no longer literally “drawing a 
red line around certain areas in which credit would be denied.”186 
Instead, people make decisions that are influenced by stereo-
types and judgments that “subtly distort the ostensibly objective 
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data set upon which a decision is ultimately based.”187 Even in 
the absence of a specific, affirmative policy, stereotypes can play 
a role in individual decisions or moments when discretion is al-
lowed.188 Housing officials and developers may no longer be be 
actively discriminating, but they still have the potential to be 
influenced by stereotypes and subconscious biases. A narrow def-
inition of policy would not capture the types of behavior that cre-
ate modern housing discrimination. 
In addition to being vague about what constitutes a policy, 
the Court’s holding also calls into question whether one-time de-
cisions would qualify as a policy. The Court only briefly dis-
cussed policies, but it did state “a one-time decision may not be 
a policy at all.”189 The section of the opinion was not controlling 
on the decision, but it does create an uphill battle for plaintiffs 
who are trying to challenge one-time decisions because the Court 
raises doubts about whether such one-time decisions are appro-
priate or even eligible for disparate-impact liability. It is not en-
tirely clear why the Court chose to question one-time decisions 
given that they can have drastic impacts on communities.190 St. 
Paul’s decision to route Interstate 94 (I-94) directly through a 
thriving black community is one stark example.191 That solitary 
decision razed an entire community that is still feeling the im-
pacts.192 Urban redevelopment plans can have a similar impact. 
For example, in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. 
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Township of Mount Holly, the plaintiffs challenged the town-
ship’s redevelopment plan as discriminatory.193 The redevelop-
ment plan could be classified as a one-time decision because it 
was triggered by an assessment that the area needed to be rede-
veloped.194 Unlike the on-going tax credit decisions made by the 
Department in Inclusive Communities, the Township of Mount 
Holly made a single decision that the neighborhood in question 
needed to be reconstructed.195 The Township did make subse-
quent decisions,196 so it might be possible for the plaintiffs to cast 
the action as a policy rather than a one-time decision. However, 
the Township could make a strong argument that it only made a 
one-time decision when it initially determined that it would re-
develop the area. That decision had sweeping effects on the com-
munity, but there is a strong probability that it could be disqual-
ified based on the robust causality standard. A similar one-time-
decision argument could be made in the context of the decision 
to route I-94 through a predominantly black neighborhood in St. 
Paul.197 The cities only made a one-time decision, but that one 
decision destroyed the homes of 650 black families and the sur-
rounding businesses.198 
One might object here that the Supreme Court did not cate-
gorically exclude one-time decisions from creating grounds for 
disparate-impact liability. Instead, the Court indicated that one-
time decisions “may not be a policy at all.”199 Such a statement 
may have been the Court abdicating a role in determining what 
a policy actually is due to the complexity of the organizations and 
decision-making structures typically involved. In that case, ro-
bust causality might not lead to the dismissal of cases with facts 
like the I-94 expansion and the Mount Holly redevelopment. Ad-
ditionally, the I-94 and Mount Holly examples involved affirma-
tive decisions made by city officials, meaning that they lend 
themselves more to being a “policy” than a discretionary system 
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like the one in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. However, 
the potential for even these extreme examples to be argued ei-
ther way demonstrates that by adding one sentence into its opin-
ion the Court has injected a new degree of uncertainty into hous-
ing discrimination cases, an uncertainty that will invite further 
arguments in lower courts. 
By raising questions about whether one-time decisions, the 
Court created ambiguity as to whether plaintiffs can challenge 
single government decisions, even those decisions that have sig-
nificant and disproportionate impact. The Court’s lack of clarity 
on what qualifies as a policy and its doubt about one-time deci-
sions severally limits plaintiffs’ access to court and allows dis-
criminatory decisions to go unchallenged. 
C. ROBUST CAUSALITY CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT ON PLEADINGS 
Inclusive Communities is flawed because it conflicts with es-
tablished Supreme Court precedent regarding the interaction 
between the pleading standard and the prima facie case. The 
Court explored the interaction between pleading and prima facie 
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema.200 In Swierkiewicz, a fifty-three-year-
old Hungarian man alleged that he was discriminated against 
because of his age.201 To support his complaint, he pointed to ev-
idence that the person hired to replace him was twenty years 
younger than him and that his supervisor “stated that he wanted 
to ‘energize’” the department.202 The Second Circuit dismissed 
the complaint because he failed to plead a prima facie case.203 
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the heightened 
pleading standard imposed by the court of appeals.204 The Court 
was adamant that “discrimination plaintiff[s] need not plead a 
prima facie case of discrimination.”205 The first the Court relied 
on was that “[t]he prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary stand-
ard, not a pleading requirement.”206 The Court further held, hav-
ing the heightened requirement undercut the liberal pleading 
standard central to the U.S. court system.207 Plaintiffs do not 
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need to plead with “greater ‘particularity,’ because this would 
‘too narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings.’”208 The Court 
explained that pleadings are supposed to give defendants notice 
of the action pending against them and focus the litigation on 
the merits, so it would be detrimental to the litigation process to 
create a heightened pleading standard.209 It also acknowledged 
that it was illogical to import the prima facie case to the pleading 
stage because “[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts 
and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation 
of the required prima facie case in a particular case.”210 The hold-
ing from Swierkcwicz demonstrates that the Court envisioned 
the pleading stage as a mechanism of giving notice, and subse-
quent stages of litigation as eliminating meritless claims.211 
Despite the ruling in Swierkiewicz, the district court in Ellis 
v. City of Minneapolis still required the plaintiffs to plead a 
prima facie case.212 The court dismissed the first complaint be-
cause the plaintiffs “failed to adequately plead a prima facie case 
of disparate impact.”213 Citing Inclusive Communities, the dis-
trict court stated that the plaintiffs needed to plead “facts that 
plausibly demonstrate[d] a causal link between the challenged 
policy and th[e] disparity.”214 The complaint was amended and 
refiled.215 When considering the second amended complaint, the 
court decided a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which 
uses the same standard of review as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.216 The plaintiffs cited Swierkiewicz to stand for the 
proposition that disparate-impact complaints do not have to 
plead a prima facie case.217 But the district court disagreed with 
the plaintiffs’ use of Swierkiewicz, holding instead that the hold-
ing from Inclusive Communities meant that plaintiff ’s need to 
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“adequately plead a prima facie case of disparate impact” in or-
der to survive a motion to dismiss, which is in direct opposition 
to Swierkiewicz.218 
Some scholars have argued that Swierkiewicz can exist 
alongside other articulations of the pleading standard as a “safe 
harbor” for discrimination complaints.219 For example, Joseph 
Seiner contends that since Swierkiewicz stands for the proposi-
tion that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination do not 
need to plead a prima facie case, if they do plead a prima facie 
case then they “should inherently survive a motion to dis-
miss.”220 In other words, Swierkiewicz created the floor, ensuring 
that anything above that floor could survive a motion to dis-
miss.221 That argument, however, requires an actual difference 
between the floor and the prima facie case. In Ellis, the court 
raised that floor to the level of a prima facie case, erasing the 
safe harbor and requiring the plaintiff to plead the elements of a 
prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss.222 Applying the 
robust causality standard at the pleading stage, as happened in 
Ellis, is the same heightened pleading standard that the Court 
specifically denounced in Swierkiewicz. By creating a link be-
tween the prima facie requirement and pleadings, the Court 
seemed to be at odds with the fundamental underpinnings of its 
reasoning. 
Additionally, Seiner and others have argued that the 
Swierkiewicz holding is limited to the pleading standard for in-
tentional employment discrimination.223 But the holding and 
reasoning from Swierkiewicz is not just limited to disparate 
treatment employment discrimination cases for several rea-
sons.224 First, the Court focused on the fact that the court of ap-
peals had “required [the] petitioner to plead a prima facie case” 
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to survive a motion to dismiss.225 It instructed lower courts that 
an evidentiary standard should not control at the pleading 
stage.226 That reasoning should apply to other discrimination 
pleadings, including disparate impact. Additionally, the Court 
was emphatic in its defense of the liberal pleading standard.227 
The goal of pleading, under the FRCP, is to “give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”228 The Court’s defense of the pleading standard 
is not specifically related to pleading in the context of employ-
ment discrimination or disparate treatment. Finally, the Sec-
ond,229 Sixth,230 Seventh,231 and Ninth232 Circuits have all ex-
pressly extended the holding from Swierkiewicz to cases 
involving housing discrimination. The Court’s holding in 
Swierkiewicz demonstrates its commitment to allowing plain-
tiffs to have their day in court, but the robust causality standard, 
with its focus on swift dismissal of complaints, contradicts that 
holding, heightening the requirement for plaintiffs to gain access 
to court. 
D. ROBUST CAUSALITY INAPPROPRIATELY GIVES DEFERENCE TO 
CITIES. 
Finally, the decision in Inclusive Communities is flawed be-
cause it carves out a zone of protection for zoning officials and 
other housing officials. In Inclusive Communities, the Court con-
ceded that zoning laws played a central role in creating a system 
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 231. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Swierkiewicz when describing what is necessary to put in a complaint that al-
leges a violation of the FHA). 
 232. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that in a housing discrimination case, “failure to plead [a prima facie 
case] does not support dismissal at the outset”). 
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of racial segregation in housing.233 But it also emphasized that 
the FHA is “not an instrument to force housing authorities to 
reorder their priorities.”234 Zoning officials have to make choices 
based “on a mix of factors, both objective (such as cost and traffic 
patterns) and, at least to some extent, subjective.”235 The Court’s 
position rests between acknowledging the importance of dispar-
ate impact as a check on government decision-making and striv-
ing to give government actors “latitude to consider market fac-
tors.”236 
The Court drew a distinction between zoning laws, which 
have a long history of being discriminatory on their face and in 
practice, and government development decisions, which the 
Court sees as beneficial to the communities.237 But there are par-
allels between city redevelopment programs and zoning laws be-
cause cities use both to influence land use and social order.238 
Development decisions by zoning officials, even if facially neu-
tral, often have profound impacts on communities.239 In the past, 
cities enacted zoning laws that would effectively force minorities 
out of certain areas or keep them hemmed in to others.240 Some 
 
 233. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015); see also Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, 
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 16–18 (1988) (per curiam) (invalidating zoning law pre-
venting construction of multifamily rental units); United States v. City of Black 
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182–88 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating ordinance prohibit-
ing construction of new multifamily dwellings); Greater New Orleans Fair 
Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569, 577–78 (E.D. 
La. 2009) (invalidating post–Hurricane Katrina ordinance restricting the rental 
of housing units to only “blood relative[s]” in an area of the city that was 88.3% 
white and 7.6% black). 
 234. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). 
 235. Id. at 2523. 
 236. Id.  
 237. See id. at 2522–23. 
 238. Justin Graham, Comment, Playing “Fair” with Urban Redevelopment: 
A Defense of Gentrification Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Test, 
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1719, 1735–38 (2013) (discussing the efforts that cities are 
making to entice wealthy residents to return to city centers). 
 239. Carla Dorsey, Note, It Takes a Village: Why Community Organizing Is 
More Effective than Litigation Alone at Ending Discriminatory Housing Code 
Enforcement, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 437, 441–52 (2005) (analyzing 
two different instances in which cities used revitalization programs and goals 
to effectively remove low-income communities from their neighborhoods).  
 240. See Gardner, supra note 33, at 327–30; Nelson, supra note 22, at 1695–
96 (discussing the racially motivated Chinese Laundry Law); Richards, supra 
note 23, at 763–67 (discussing how facially neutral laws about building size 
were used to control who could afford to live in certain areas of a city); see also 
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cities and states still use facially neutral building codes to ac-
complish substantive goals.241 But now, redevelopment efforts 
often push lower income populations out to make room for 
wealthier groups in the way that zoning codes used to.242 For 
example, in the Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. 
Township of Mount Holly case mentioned above, a redevelop-
ment plan essentially ousted African American residents from a 
section of the town.243 In that case the city decided to redevelop 
an area, predominantly inhabited by African Americans, which 
had begun to deteriorate.244 The city created a revitalization 
plan, which included demolishing some older buildings and con-
structing new housing units.245 The new housing units were 
priced well above what the former residents could afford, effec-
tively expelling the former residents, much like economic zoning 
 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 55–56 (1993) (discussing how city 
councils used their power over federal housing funds to build new projects in 
existing minority neighborhoods). 
 241. In July 2013, Texas enacted a law that required clinics providing abor-
tions to comply with many of the same building codes imposed on ambulatory 
surgical centers. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Abortion Re-
strictions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/ 
supreme-court-texas-abortion.html; David Nather, Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Texas Abortion Clinic Regulations, SCI. AM. (June 27, 2016), https://www 
.scientificamerican.com/article/supreme-court-strikes-down-texas-abortion 
-clinic-regulations. Commentators argued that the law was actually designed to 
limit access to abortion clinics. Nischay Bhan, Contested Spaces: Texas’s HB2 
and the Weaponization of Building Code, YALE PAPRIKA, http://www 
.yalepaprika.com/contested-spaces-texass-hb2-and-the-weaponization-of 
-building-code (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). In fact, about half of the state’s forty 
one clinics had to close down after the passage of the law. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, 
Here’s What Happened when Texas Cracked Down on Abortion Clinics, L.A. 
TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-abortion 
-figures-20160630-snap-story.html. 
 242. Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Dis-
placement in the Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1194–
99 (2016) (defining gentrification as “a systematic remake of the class composi-
tion of urban areas due to the displacement of low-income residents and busi-
nesses”). 
 243. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount 
Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 378 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing the neighborhood’s de-
mographics and the effects of the city’s redevelopment plan). 
 244. Id. (“The neighborhood was not perfect. For one, it was crowded. This 
created a parking shortage, which led residents to pave their backyards for use 
as driveways, which, in turn, led to drainage problems. In addition, the fact that 
the homes were owned in fee simple meant there was no one with a vested in-
terest in maintaining common spaces, such as the alleys. Some of the owners 
were nothing more than absentee landlords, renting to individuals with little 
interest in maintaining the properties.”). 
 245. Id. at 379. 
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laws did in the past.246 The Township used a redevelopment plan 
to accomplish much the same impact as zoning laws, and the 
Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evi-
dence to sustain a prima facie case that the redevelopment plan 
had a disparate impact on African Americans.247 The court em-
phasized the fact that disparate-impact claims are about 
whether a community has been “disproportionately affected” or 
is “disproportionately burdened” by the actions of the defend-
ant.248 The results from Mount Holly show that, in fact, redevel-
opment plans can also drive out communities, particularly com-
munities of color or low-income communities, and have a 
disparate impact in much the same way that historic zoning laws 
did. It is shortsighted of the Supreme Court to attempt to draw 
a distinction between zoning laws and redevelopment plans, be-
cause the impact is very similar. 
Granted, housing codes, redevelopment plans, and zoning 
laws do play an important role in ensuring the safety of tenants. 
Housing codes have been in place since the late 1800s and arose 
primarily in response to public health and safety concerns.249 
Most municipalities have some form of housing code.250 Lawsuits 
that challenged basic safety housing codes, like Gallagher v. 
Magner, might have motivated the Supreme Court to protect de-
fendants and by extension ensure that housing codes remained 
in place. The opinion in Inclusive Communities references Mag-
ner, noting, “Magner was decided without the cautionary stand-
ards announced in this opinion.”251 The circumstances surround-
ing Magner paint a bleak picture of the living conditions of the 
tenants.252 Housing codes play an important role in ensuring 
safe housing options. 
 
 246. The new homes cost around $200,000, while the city had purchased the 
homes from residents at prices around $45,000. Id. at 380. The residents also 
had to endure years of having their neighborhood disrupted by construction, 
including substantial damage due to the interconnected nature of the homes. 
Id. 
 247. Id. at 382. 
 248. Id. at 383. 
 249. H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 29, 31 (1996); Dorsey, supra note 
239, at 440. 
 250. Ross, supra note 249, at 31. 
 251. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015). 
 252. The properties “received code enforcement orders that, in many cases, 
cited between ten and twenty-five violations per property for conditions includ-
ing rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, 
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Notwithstanding the fact that most housing codes are de-
signed to provide “a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family,”253 the enforcement of those 
codes can still be used as a weapon to change or remove a com-
munity.254 For example, the municipalities of Stockton, Califor-
nia, and Addison, Illinois, both aggressively enforced housing 
codes as a means of regaining downtown property for the city.255 
The properties in question were primarily owned or rented by 
minority groups.256 
In Inclusive Communities, the Court attempted to strike a 
balance between these two sides of housing codes, but conveyed 
instead the sense that such codes should not be second-guessed. 
The Court held that enforcement of housing codes is a “valid gov-
ernmental polic[y]”257 that should be protected, but also recog-
nized that those codes can “arbitrarily creat[e] discriminatory ef-
fects or perpetuat[e] segregation.”258 That section of the Court’s 
analysis struck a balance between the importance of safety and 
also recognizing that housing codes can be wielded in a discrim-
inatory fashion, as in Stockton and Addison. Much of the rest of 
the analysis, however, instead communicates the importance of 
protecting government policies and priorities from second-guess-
ing. The Court specifically noted that it was not the goal of the 
FHA to place cities and developers in a “double bind” if they de-
cide to act or not.259 The Court also acknowledged that zoning 
officials “must often make decisions based on a mix of factors” 
and that the FHA does not “decree a particular vision of urban 
development.”260 Finally, the Court criticized the motivations 
underlying the plaintiffs’ complaint, noting that it might “simply 
 
inadequate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and 
screens, and broken or missing guardrails or handrails.” Gallagher v. Magner, 
619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 253. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949). 
 254. Dorsey, supra note 239, at 441–51 (describing two instances in which 
cities used housing codes to remove low-income home owners from their houses). 
 255. Id.; see also Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1260 (E.D. 
Cal. 2005) (describing enforcement policies); Hispanics United of DuPage Cty. 
v. Village of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1140–43 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same). 
 256. Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1139; Dorsey, supra note 239, at 442–
43. 
 257. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522, 2524 (2015). 
 258. Id. at 2522. 
 259. Id. at 2523. 
 260. Id. 
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[be] an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable ap-
proaches a housing authority should follow.”261 Weaving these 
comments into the rest of the analysis indicates that the Court 
was attempting to shield decision-makers from liability. While 
cities often act with the motivation of improving quality and 
safety of housing, that does not preclude their actions from hav-
ing a disproportionate effect on minority communities.262 As the 
Third Circuit reminded lower courts in Mount Holly, “Disparate 
impact claims . . . do not require proof of discriminatory in-
tent.”263 A city’s motivations are not relevant; if the action has 
“disproportionately burdened a particular racial group” or other 
group, then there is a disparate impact.264 The Court may have 
wanted to protect government discretion, but that discretion can 
and has had a disproportionate burden on specific, often minor-
ity communities. Cities and zoning officials do not always war-
rant the benefit of the doubt. 
One might note here that without robust causality, there 
could be even more efforts to litigate every decision made by zon-
ing officials, leaving cities unwilling to act to “even make slum-
lords kill rats [because of the] fear of a lawsuit.”265 The dissent 
in Inclusive Communities stressed this potential consequence, 
focusing particularly on the deteriorating houses in Magner.266 
While unquestionably landlords do and have used litigation to 
avoid their responsibilities under city codes, that does not mean 
that legal avenues should be curtailed for all, especially because 
there are also instances where enforcement of housing codes by 
cities has been motivated by discriminatory intent or had dis-
criminatory impact.267 In fact, Stockton purposely increased its 
 
 261. Id. at 2522. 
 262. See, e.g., Li, supra note 242, at 1196–1203 (discussing the impact that 
some city “redevelopment” plans have on minority communities).  
 263. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township. of Mount Holly, 
658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 266. Id. (“[The Eighth Circuit] concluded that the city’s ‘aggressive enforce-
ment of the Housing Code’ was actionable because making landlords respond to 
‘rodent infestation, missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, in-
adequate heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors,’ and the 
like increased the price of rent.”). 
 267. See, e.g., Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264 (E.D. Cal. 
2005) (discussing how the city adopted a strategy of aggressive enforcement of 
housing codes in order to regain the property for the city). 
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enforcement of housing codes as part of a conscious effort to re-
gain control of that property in that section of the city.268 In St. 
Paul, aggressive enforcement of the housing codes led to forced 
sales, which meant that low-income tenants were evicted from 
their housing.269 Even if the city is not trying to evict tenants or 
regain control of the property, sometimes enforcement of hous-
ing codes can have deeply negative impacts on communities. 
Challenging these laws through litigation might not always be 
the answer because it could discourage cities from enforcing laws 
that increase the safety and habitability of residences. However, 
increasing the barriers to plaintiffs at the pleading stage could 
also prevent plaintiffs like those in Price v. City of Stockton from 
being able to dispute city action. Litigation may be a blunt tool, 
but it is a necessary one. 
The Inclusive Communities decision recognized disparate-
impact liability, but in a limited manner. The new robust causal-
ity standard requires plaintiffs to point to a specific, ongoing pol-
icy causing disparate impact and encourages lower courts to dis-
miss the cases early in the litigation process. Moreover, the new 
requirement does not provide sufficient guidance to lower courts, 
and the guidance that it does provide conflicts with the reality of 
disparate impact and the Court’s own precedent. The significant 
drawbacks to this standard should encourage the Court to aban-
don the robust causality standard and rely on traditional plead-
ing standards. 
III.  THE ROBUST CAUSALITY STANDARD IS AN 
UNNECESSARY BARRIER TO CLAIMS OF HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION.   
Given the significant problems with robust causality, the 
Court should abandon that standard and continue to rely on the 
traditional pleading standard and disparate-impact analysis. 
Requiring causation so early in a disparate-impact case is un-
necessary given the protections for defendants that already ex-
ist. The Court should also return to traditional disparate-impact 
analysis because it is better adapted to modern discrimination. 
Section A demonstrates that defendants already have suffi-
cient protection at the pleading stage. Section B contends that 
the robust causality standard cannot remain because it does not 
reflect the reality of discriminatory practices. Ultimately, this 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 835 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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Note concludes that the Court should abandon robust causality 
because both the traditional pleading standard and disparate-
impact analysis already provide legal protections for defendants. 
A. ROBUST CAUSALITY SHOULD BE ABANDONED BECAUSE 
CURRENT PLEADING STANDARDS RENDER IT UNNECESSARY AND 
REDUNDANT. 
The Court should abandon robust causality because the cur-
rent pleading standard already sufficiently protects defendants. 
The Court may have been concerned about a proliferation of dis-
parate-impact cases if it did not place some limits at the pleading 
stage. However, the current legal standard for motions to dis-
miss already protects defendants.270 The current jurisprudence 
for evaluating a pleading originates with the Twombly and Iqbal 
cases.271 Those two cases instruct courts to engage in a two-step 
analysis of a pleading.272 The court first sifts through the allega-
tions to determine which are factual and which are legal conclu-
sions.273 Then, using only the facts, the court determines 
whether a claim is plausible.274 The plausibility inquiry in-
structs courts to employ “judicial experience and common sense” 
in order to determine what is plausible.275 Observers have de-
scribed how that instruction from the Supreme Court serves two 
functions: it elevates the legal barriers at the pleading stage276 
and injects a higher degree of subjectivity into the analysis.277 
So, rather than the pleading serving as notice of impending liti-
gation,278 pleadings must now bear the heightened duty of pass-
ing a plausibility test.279 Plausibility already provides more pro-
tection for defendants than the prior standard, which was that a 
“complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
 
 270. See generally Brescia, supra note 99 (discussing the impact of the plau-
sibility standard on discrimination claims). 
 271. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 272. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (2009). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
 276. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response 
to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1723 (2013). 
 277. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 9–11 (2009). 
 278. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 
 279. See Clark, supra note 79, at 457–58 (discussing the historical disad-
vantages of requiring particularity in pleading). 
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set of facts in support of his claim.”280 The Supreme Court has 
already changed the fundamental role of the pleading stage in 
such a way that makes it more challenging for complaints to sur-
vive motions to dismiss. 
The current system already provides sufficient protection 
for defendants without robust causality. Robust causality has 
similar philosophical underpinnings to plausibility. The Court 
created the plausibility standard to protect telecommunication 
companies from lawsuits alleging collusion when the plaintiffs 
only had evidence of parallel behavior,281 meaning that the 
Court did not want defendants to be responsible for market col-
lusion unless they actually created an anticompetitive atmos-
phere. Similarly, in Inclusive Communities, the Court held that 
the robust causality standard was necessary to “protect[] defend-
ants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not cre-
ate.”282 Both of these standards exist, then, to ensure that when 
defendants are hauled into court they are there to actually an-
swer for a charge that is tied to their behavior. In light of the fact 
that robust causality seeks to accomplish the same objective as 
the plausibility standard, robust causality should be abandoned 
as an unnecessary and redundant standard.  
At this point, some might argue that if there is already judi-
cial scrutiny of the pleading then robust causality will not harm 
plaintiffs because it does not diverge from what is currently ex-
pected. While it is true that the goal of robust causality echoes 
that in Twombly and Iqbal, it is also important to acknowledge 
that even if the standards are similar, robust causality does re-
quire something different. Twombly and Iqbal instruct courts to 
determine if a complaint is plausible, while robust causality 
blends the requirements for the prima facie stage with the plead-
ing stage, holding that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at 
the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating 
a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact.”283 Both plausibility and robust causality may in-
volve the court giving more scrutiny to a complaint than it might 
 
 280. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 281. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal 
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 570–71 (2010) (describing the alle-
gations of parallel conduct in Twombly). 
 282. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015). 
 283. Id. 
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have faced prior to Twombly and Iqbal or Inclusive Communi-
ties, but they are not identical requirements. Maintaining robust 
causality would normalize a trend of requiring more and more at 
early, undeveloped stages of the litigation process, which is an-
tithetical to the notice pleading philosophy. The Court should 
abandon robust causality because the plausibility standard 
alone accomplishes the goals that motivated robust causality. 
In addition to already having jurisprudence that protects de-
fendants, empirical studies of case outcomes show that the plau-
sibility standard has, in practice, protected defendants. Kendall 
Hannon conducted an analysis of the rate of dismissal for civil 
rights cases before and after the holdings from Twombly and Iq-
bal.284 He found that the number of cases dismissed after those 
cases increased by eleven points and the number of denied mo-
tions to dismiss decreased by seven points.285 Other studies have 
also found a slight but statistically significant increase in the 
number of motions to dismiss judges granted in civil rights 
cases.286 The empirical evidence suggests that the plausibility 
standard has actually played the role that it was intended to play 
and decreased the likelihood of a complaint surviving a motion 
to dismiss. The real-world result of the plausibility standard fur-
ther underscores how unnecessary and redundant the robust 
causality standard is. 
Robust causality is also unnecessary because it is a gener-
ally applicable standard that was prompted to control an issue 
that was already under control in the lower courts. Part of the 
opinion in Inclusive Communities was concerned about cases like 
Magner, where landlords attempted to use the FHA to evade 
their responsibilities under city housing codes.287 The Inclusive 
Communities Court noted that the Magner case, which found 
that the landlords were able to establish a prima facie case of 
 
 284. Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the 
Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1811 (2008). 
 285. Id. at 1837. 
 286. Benjamin Sunshine & Víctor Abel Pereyra, Access-to-Justice v. Effi-
ciency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates After Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 357, 363–71 (summarizing studies); Brescia, supra note 99, at 260–
68 (concluding that courts are more likely to dismiss housing discrimination 
complaints after Twombly and Iqbal); Hatamyar, supra note 281, at 607). 
 287. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015) (stating that FHA suits must not be used to prevent 
government entities from enforcing housing codes); Gallagher v. Magner, 
619 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (describing code violations). 
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disparate impact,288 was “decided without the cautionary stand-
ards announced in this opinion,”289 implying that robust causal-
ity would have prevented those plaintiffs from successfully sur-
viving a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. 
The Court appears to have been concerned that more of these 
cases might appear to lead to “perverse outcomes” where the 
FHA is used to “maintain the status quo of substandard hous-
ing.”290 In spite of that potential, empirical research by Stacy 
Seicshnaydre indicates that lower courts had been doing a suffi-
cient job of controlling for perverse outcomes without robust cau-
sality.291 Seicshnaydre analyzed the appellate record for both 
housing-barrier and housing-improvement disparate-impact 
claims.292 Housing-improvement claims, like Magner, were only 
half as successful in litigation as more traditional housing-bar-
rier claims.293 Based upon her research, lower courts were skep-
tical of housing improvement claims even before robust causal-
ity, and they were efficiently disposing or dismissing those cases. 
Robust causality is unnecessary because it was a solution in 
search of a problem. 
Robust causality is a redundant and unnecessary standard. 
The plausibility standard seeks to accomplish the same goal that 
the Court articulated when announcing robust causality. Plau-
sibility has been successful in practice in decreasing the number 
of discrimination claims that survive early stages of litigation. 
As such, even without a robust causality standard, there are suf-
ficient protections for defendants to ensure that frivolous law-
suits are handled appropriately. The Court needs to abandon ro-
bust causality because it merely reiterates the goals of the 
current standard. 
B. ROBUST CAUSALITY FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ROLE OF 
UNCONSCIOUS BIAS AND HISTORY STILL INFLUENCES DECISIONS. 
The Supreme Court should abandon robust causality be-
cause the traditional disparate impact framework is better 
adapted to combat modern discrimination and further the FHA’s 
 
 288. Magner, 619 F.3d at 834–35. 
 289. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015). 
 290. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Ap-
pellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 392, 407 (2013). 
 291. Id. at 399–402, 413. 
 292. Id. at 399–403. 
 293. Id. at 400–01. 
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goal of “fair housing throughout the United States.”294 Through-
out much of the United States’ history, people in positions of 
power sought to prevent minority groups from living in certain 
areas.295 Now, bankers do not draw red lines around neighbor-
hoods and landowners do not include racial covenants in 
deeds,296 but “discrimination is still pervasive, now more often 
in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias.”297 Unconscious 
bias298 and historical systems of discrimination299 continue un-
checked in systems that rely on discretion.300 
The impact of discretionary systems can be seen in both 
home mortgage lending and access to housing. For example, New 
York University did an investigation of home mortgage lending 
and found that there were stark differences in the rates given to 
 
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 295. Richards, supra note 23, at 763–67. 
 296. Sometimes these racial covenants remain in deeds but are not enforced. 
Randy Furst, Massive Project Works to Uncover Racist Restrictions in Minneap-
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 297. Hart, supra note 12, at 741. 
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CHOLOGY 361, 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (concluding that 
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 299. For example, in Dallas, the city at the center of Inclusive Communities, 
there is a long history of racial segregation that has resulted in neighborhoods 
that are, to this day, separated predominantly along racial lines rather than 
solely by income. John D. Harden, Maps Show Visible Racial Divides in Major 
Texas Cities, Hous. Chron. (July 24, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/houston-texas/article/Highways-interstates-reinforce-divides-in-Texas 
-6399606.php; Timmy Huynh & Lauren Kent, In Greater Dallas Area, Segrega-
tion by Income and Race, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 29, 2015), http://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/29/in-greater-dallas-area-segregation-by 
-income-and-race; Neena Satija, Dallas Struggles to Escape Segregated Legacy, 
TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/02/dallas 
-struggles-overcome-segregated-housing-legac. This pattern is likely influenced 
by the choice to continue to place low-income housing exclusively in the city 
center as the government was doing in Inclusive Communities. 
 300. Hart, supra note 12, at 746–47, 767–69. 
 1014 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:969 
 
people of color and those given to white people.301 Loan officers 
often have discretion when making loan decisions,302 much like 
the discretion granted to the Department in distributing tax 
credits in Inclusive Communities.303 A similar uneven distribu-
tion of resources also occurs in rental markets. For example, re-
searchers at Oregon State University found discrimination in 
rental markets that operate under a system of discretion.304 
They sent out 1100 identical emails inquiring about housing but 
with different names attached (Patrick McDougall, Tyrell Jack-
son or Said Al-Rahman) to indirectly indicate the race of the 
sender.305 The emails received a different percentage of positive 
responses. “The fictional McDougall received positive or encour-
aging replies from 89 percent of the landlords, while Al-Rahman 
was encouraged by 66 percent of the landlords. Only 56 percent, 
however, responded positively to Jackson.”306 In circumstances 
where people are either attempting to obtain lending for housing 
or access to housing, discretionary systems can lead to situations 
where there is disparate impact. 
The Supreme Court has previously held that discretionary 
decisions can be challenged using disparate impact.307 In Watson 
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, Watson, a black woman, was passed 
over for a promotion four times, and each time a white person 
 
 301. Manny Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgage by Race, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/nyregion/ 
15subprime.html. 
 302. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $21 
Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Sun-
trust Mortgage (May 31, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice 
-department-reaches-21-million-settlement-resolve-allegations-lending 
-discrimination (discussing how the loan officers at SunTrust Mortgage had 
“pricing discretion”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimina-
tion by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-resolve 
-allegations-lending-discrimination (discussing how the loan officers at Coun-
trywide had “pricing discretion”). 
 303. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (mentioning that TDHCA had discretion when dis-
tributing tax credits). 
 304. New Published Study: Name is Enough When it Comes to Discrimina-
tion, OR. ST. U. (May 23, 2006), http://www.oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/ 
2006/may/new-published-study-name-enough-when-it-comes-discrimination. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
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(both men and women) were chosen instead.308 The hiring deci-
sions were made based upon a discretionary “subjective selection 
method[]”309 much like the subjective methods used to grant 
loans or select tenants. The Court concluded “that subjective or 
discretionary employment practices may be analyzed under the 
disparate impact approach.”310 The Court recognized that if it 
held otherwise, discrimination law could “largely be nullified” 
because it would be easy for defendants to circumvent antidis-
crimination laws by merely having a discretionary system.311 
The Court needs to abandon robust causality and use its dis-
parate impact precedent because under robust causality it is not 
clear whether these discretionary decisions would be considered 
appropriate targets of lawsuits. For example, one court has al-
ready rejected a challenge to a bank’s loan program using robust 
causality. In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo, a lower court 
dismissed the case for failure to cite a specific policy when alleg-
ing that there had been discriminatory loans.312 The lack of clar-
ity about what qualifies as a policy and the antiquated concep-
tion of discrimination is already making it difficult for plaintiffs 
because it is not clear what is necessary to satisfy their burden 
so they can challenge these discriminatory patterns. 
Some might argue that allowing discretionary practices to 
be challenged will open the floodgates to litigation, but there are 
several mechanisms that act as checks. First, the courts can em-
phasize the actual impact of the discretionary practice. For ex-
ample, the district court in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo 
determined that the difference between the loans given to white 
and nonwhite applicants was negligible: 
  [A]n Hispanic Wells Fargo borrower with average non-race charac-
teristics had a 0.0033% likelihood of receiving a High-Cost Loan, a sim-
ilarly situated African-American Wells Fargo borrower had a 0.0067% 
likelihood of receiving a High-Cost Loan, while a similarly situated 
non-Hispanic white borrower face[d] only a 0.0008% likelihood of re-
ceiving a High-Cost Loan.313 
In that case, Wells Fargo’s discretionary framework had es-
sentially the same impact on white and nonwhite applicants. In 
comparison, the recipients of the predatory loans granted by 
 
 308. Id. at 982. 
 309. Id. at 989. 
 310. Id. at 991. 
 311. Id. at 989. 
 312. No. 2:13-CV-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015 WL 4398858, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 
17, 2015), aff ’d, No. 15-56157, 2017 WL 2304375 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017) (per 
curiam).  
 313. Id. at *7. 
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SunTrust, a bank that reached a settlement with the Depart-
ment of Justice,314 were nearly sixty percent black.315 As the 
Third Circuit reminded the district court that had previously 
heard the Mount Holly case, disparate-impact claims are about 
“ask[ing] whether minorities are disproportionately affected.”316 
In the context of disparate impact, whether the practice is dis-
cretionary or standardized is less important than its impact. 
The other way to limit challenges to discretionary practices 
is to examine whether there is a unifying actor authorizing or 
operating in the system. In Watson, for example, the plaintiff 
was working at a bank that “had not developed precise and for-
mal criteria for evaluating candidates . . . [but] relied instead on 
the subjective judgment of supervisors.”317 While different su-
pervisors were responsible for each of the hiring decisions, they 
were all operating and deciding under the same discretionary 
system. The Court suggested such a requirement in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.318 In Dukes, the central issue was about 
whether the plaintiffs had enough in common to satisfy class ac-
tion requirements, but the Court did analyze when it was appro-
priate to challenge a discretionary decision-making structure.319 
The Court found that a discretionary practice would be appro-
priate for disparate-impact liability if the plaintiffs identified a 
“common mode of exercising discretion.”320 In the end, the Court 
did not certify the class in Dukes because there was no such com-
mon mode across every Wal-mart store nation-wide.321 The deci-
sion in Dukes illustrates that there are some limits on challeng-
ing discretionary systems, whether that means looking for a 
common supervisor or company culture. There are current pro-
tections in place for defendants; abandoning robust causality 
would not leave defendants vulnerable to a flood of litigation. 
  CONCLUSION   
With the decision in Inclusive Communities, the Supreme 
Court was trying to address a problem of defendants—cities in 
 
 314. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 31, 2012), supra note 302. 
 315. Complaint at 2, United States v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 12-cv-00397-
REP (E.D. Va. May 31, 2012). 
 316. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 
658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 317. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988). 
 318. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355–57 (2011). 
 319. Id. at 349, 355–57. 
 320. Id. at 356. 
 321. Id. at 359–60. 
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particular—being held liable for disparate impact regardless of 
which action they chose. The Court attempted to strike a balance 
between two competing interests. On the one hand, the Court 
recognized disparate-impact liability under the FHA, which is 
important because actors do not typically announce their inten-
tions to discriminate. On the other hand, the Court wanted to 
allow cities the flexibility to respond to complex housing and ur-
ban development factors by giving them some protection from 
lawsuits. So, it recognized disparate impact but required plain-
tiffs to satisfy a robust causality standard. 
While the Court was trying to strike the right balance, ro-
bust causality should ultimately be abandoned because it con-
tributes nothing to the protection of defendants and conflicts 
with other precedent and the reality of the impact of housing de-
cision. Robust causality is fundamentally flawed because it: (1) 
lacks sufficient guidance for lower courts, (2) conflicts with prec-
edent concerning the role of the pleading and summary judg-
ment stages of litigation; and (3) it seeks to protect actors who 
have a long history of creating and perpetuating systems of dis-
crimination in housing. Ultimately, robust causality can be 
abandoned because the standard currently in place at the plead-
ing stage and embedded in disparate-impact analysis suffi-
ciently protects defendants from frivolous litigation. Housing 
discrimination is a deeply embedded reality in the United 
States—one that has impact on many other facets of life. Plain-
tiffs deserve to be able to challenge those decisions in the courts 
that were created to protect individual rights. 
